Post by Drychnath on Nov 3, 2005 23:17:33 GMT -5
Given that Atheism rejects the possibility of any force external to man, it is almost unconditionally an aspect of this system of beliefs that free will is precluded because of the way our world works. Specifically, we know through the revelations of science how it is that we feel and think, and how to predict with considerable accuracy the workings of the natural world.
The argument is that since we can determine the results of any action, and that all actions cause equal and opposite reactions, and given that no change in a system can occur without a force acting on it (which we can likewise predict and examine), with sufficient data we can therefore predict all things with perfect accuracy. This includes the firing of synapses which accompany our decision making processes and emotional reactions. Therefore, there is no free will. When a thing can be known, it is already foreordained by that which came before.
I have been considering this, and while the argument has no real logical flaw, the following things occured to me:
1) Given our knowledge of the workings of the natural world, we can already determine that we can measure no thing without altering it; even the act of subjecting a thing to observation alters it (such as a micron telescope). This would destroy our ability to take measurements with perfect accuracy, and therefore our capacity to predict things with perfect accuracy is destroyed (even given the ability to predict the effects of such observation reasonably). Furthermore, if the act of observation unavoidably alters what you are observing, what does that say about the perfection of our calculations in the first place (given that physics is, at this juncture, essentially our compiled and tested observations of how te world works)?
2) There are essentially infinite factors to consider for every occurance. Therefore even given the capacity to acquire perfect data, and process it with perfect calculations, we cannot make complete calculations.
The conclusion these two realizations led me to is that even given the above argument, we in fact cannot know the results with perfect accuracy. Given the inability to know the answer, we cannot know if it could have turned out differently than it comes to pass. Ultimately, therefore, we can determine that all things may be subject to the same rules, but we cannot determine how those rules affect all things. And seeing as how this runs contrary to the argument that what can be known is unavoidable, then it is therefore effectively avoidable, and we have free will by default.
Thoughts? I no doubt will refine the theory for debate purposes in the future, but there it is in rough form.
The argument is that since we can determine the results of any action, and that all actions cause equal and opposite reactions, and given that no change in a system can occur without a force acting on it (which we can likewise predict and examine), with sufficient data we can therefore predict all things with perfect accuracy. This includes the firing of synapses which accompany our decision making processes and emotional reactions. Therefore, there is no free will. When a thing can be known, it is already foreordained by that which came before.
I have been considering this, and while the argument has no real logical flaw, the following things occured to me:
1) Given our knowledge of the workings of the natural world, we can already determine that we can measure no thing without altering it; even the act of subjecting a thing to observation alters it (such as a micron telescope). This would destroy our ability to take measurements with perfect accuracy, and therefore our capacity to predict things with perfect accuracy is destroyed (even given the ability to predict the effects of such observation reasonably). Furthermore, if the act of observation unavoidably alters what you are observing, what does that say about the perfection of our calculations in the first place (given that physics is, at this juncture, essentially our compiled and tested observations of how te world works)?
2) There are essentially infinite factors to consider for every occurance. Therefore even given the capacity to acquire perfect data, and process it with perfect calculations, we cannot make complete calculations.
The conclusion these two realizations led me to is that even given the above argument, we in fact cannot know the results with perfect accuracy. Given the inability to know the answer, we cannot know if it could have turned out differently than it comes to pass. Ultimately, therefore, we can determine that all things may be subject to the same rules, but we cannot determine how those rules affect all things. And seeing as how this runs contrary to the argument that what can be known is unavoidable, then it is therefore effectively avoidable, and we have free will by default.
Thoughts? I no doubt will refine the theory for debate purposes in the future, but there it is in rough form.